

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/PV.321  
10 August 1967  
ENGLISH

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIRST MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 10 August 1967, at 10.30 a.m.

THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN  
OCT 6 1967  
DOCUMENT  
COLLECTION

Chairman:

Mr. H. KHALLAF

(United Arab Republic)

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## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA

Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV

Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Burma:

U KYAW MIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. C.J. MARSHALL

Mr. J.R. MORDEN

Mr. A. BERNIER

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Mr. J. STRUCKA

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ZELLEKE

Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI

Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. R. CARACCILO

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

Mr. E. FRANCO

Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Nigeria:

Mr. B.O. TONWE

Poland:

Mr. J. GOLDBLAT

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Romania:

Mr. N. ECOBESCO  
Mr. O. IONESCO  
Mr. C. GEORGESCO  
Mr. A. COROIANU

Sweden:

Mr. A. EDELSTAM  
Mr. I. VIRGIN  
Mr. R. BOMAN  
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN  
Mr. V.P. SUSLOV  
Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF  
Mr. A. OSMAN  
Mr. O. SIRRY  
Mr. M. SHAKER

United Kingdom:

Sir Harold BEELEY  
Mr. I.F. PORTER  
Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE

United States of America:

Mr. G. BUNN  
Mr. C. GLEYSTEEN  
Mr. G. BREAM  
Mr. A.F. NEIDLE

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic): I declare open the 321st plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. I have no names on my list of speakers for today. Does any representative wish to speak?
2. Mr. TRIVEDI (India): There was really no need for me to speak this morning, but I thought I should not let the day pass without some thoughts being discussed in our Committee, particularly following two of the most outstanding contributions we have heard from representatives for a long time. We have listened to an inspiring and thought-provoking address by the Foreign Minister of Italy, Mr. Fanfani (ENDC/PV.318); and we have heard, after a certain lapse of time, a very illuminating and interesting statement by the representative of Romania (ENDC/PV.320). I think that both those statements will remain outstanding contributions to our debate.
3. Of course, the statement made by the Foreign Minister of Italy will need to be studied very carefully by all countries -- nuclear-weapon Powers and non-nuclear-weapon Powers --, by members of this Committee and members of the world community outside this Committee. However, I thought I should point out that that particular statement by the Foreign Minister of Italy and the one he made two years ago (ENDC/PV.219) were both based on the correct approach to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the approach being that non-proliferation is not simply a matter of asking only the non-nuclear countries to do something. It will be recalled that in his memorable appeal two years ago he said that the nuclear Powers would have to undertake measures of disarmament and that, pending this, certain things should be done (*ibid.*, pp. 18, 19). In my view, the present proposal also is posited on that philosophy.
4. A similar comment applies to the statement made by the representative of Romania. The principles outlined by him, particularly referring to the question of the obligations of the nuclear-weapon Powers, to the need for a non-discriminatory treaty and to the need for placing no impediments whatsoever in the way of the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes -- which he said was one of the cardinal principles -- are, I believe, the principles which we should all consider in our examination of a draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

5. While speaking this morning I should like to mention that we have always maintained that the two considerations we must bear in mind if we wish to avoid dissemination of nuclear weapons to additional countries are first prestige and secondly security. The Indian delegation has spoken about those matters at great length on various occasions.

6. Sometimes it is not realized that, without consciously making any efforts in that direction, some of us may be making propositions which invest the nuclear-weapon Powers with prestige, with a specially-privileged position. If it is argued, for example, that the Charter gives special privileges to the permanent members of the Security Council, the present members of the nuclear-weapon club -- that because they are permanent members of the Security Council they should have nuclear weapons --, that is the most fallacious argument in the world, and I hope it will never be used, for it can never be accepted by the countries of the world. First of all, of course, the Charter does not say that only the permanent members of the Security Council should have the right to possess or acquire nuclear weapons. The Charter does not suggest that, despite the Irish resolution (1665(XVI)), exceptions would be made in their case. Nor were the earlier proposals, such as the Baruch plan, the Gromyko plan and all the other plans, insincere or meant to apply only after the five members had acquired nuclear weapons. That is not the position. If it is contended that because a permanent member has nuclear weapons it should be allowed to have them and others should not, that is an argument which the peoples of the world will never accept. I know that is not intended; but we must not be led, even by implication -- as I said, unconsciously -- into that kind of thinking.

7. Another argument which has been used is the one about "neighbours": that if one country acquires nuclear weapons its neighbour will acquire nuclear weapons; that, for example, if the Soviet Union acquires nuclear weapons, Finland will acquire such weapons; or that if the United States acquires such weapons, Cuba must acquire such weapons. That kind of argument does not carry any conviction; in fact it justifies the fear of countries that their neighbours may have acquired nuclear weapons. In fact that is an argument that should have been used earlier for preventing the third Power, the fourth Power and the fifth Power from acquiring nuclear weapons. You must not say, "For the five Powers it is all right; but if the sixth Power acquires nuclear weapons there may be a seventh, eighth and ninth". It just does not stand to reason.

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

8. In fact that argument supports the thesis that the spreading of nuclear weapons to other countries -- to neighbours -- can be prevented only if the existing nuclear Powers do something about it. That is the thesis that has been used throughout in our discussions on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, the argument, for example, that because the United Kingdom has nuclear weapons Iceland should have nuclear weapons does not carry any conviction. Unfortunately, every country has disputes with its neighbours, but that does not mean that the possession of nuclear weapons by certain countries is justified or that the acquisition of such weapons by certain countries is justified.

9. In any event, the case for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons relies not on bogies but on real fundamental grounds, on grounds that make it necessary for us to attempt to eradicate the nuclear menace. The first step is to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. That should be a constructive step, a genuine step, a step which really prevents proliferation of nuclear weapons by nuclear Powers or non-nuclear Powers.

10. Then there is the question of security. It is quite true that real security lies in disarmament. The Indian delegation has always maintained and continues to maintain that one cannot possibly have security under a régime of nuclear weapons. At the same time, it is unfortunate that the possessors of nuclear weapons have always linked such weapons to the question of security. For example, whenever propositions have been put forward for nuclear-free zones, they have said that they could not permit them because that would affect their security. Whenever propositions have been put forward for reductions of the stockpiles of nuclear delivery vehicles -- drastic and substantial reductions -- they have said that they could not make such reductions because that would affect their security. When propositions have been put forward to give assurances that nuclear weapons would not be used against countries not possessing them or having them in their territories, the argument has been used that that would affect the concepts of military planning and strategy for security.

11. The very fact that there are military pacts has been justified in arguments on the ground of security; otherwise the simple answer would be to dissolve the security pacts. It is not correct to say that there is no security problem. If there were no security problem, why should there be any security pacts -- the NATO and Warsaw pacts and the little subsidiary pacts?

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

12. While talking about security I should also mention that when the question of the "cut-off" of fissile material has been put forward the question of security has again been brought in.

13. The question of security is important also because at least one country which has acquired nuclear weapons has publicly stated that nuclear weapons are meant as an instrument of its State policy, as an instrument for liberating people, as an instrument of war, as an instrument of some kind of revolution, cultural or otherwise. It is a question of security.

14. Therefore, when we are talking about a treaty which will require countries to take certain steps for the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons, the questions of security and security guarantees will be paramount. Whether or not one includes relevant paragraphs in the treaty, or how they are included, is a different matter; but these considerations will be paramount in the minds of people in considering any draft placed before us.

15. Mr. BURNS (Canada): I am sure we have all been most interested to hear the extemporaneous remarks made by the representative of India. If I understood his meaning correctly, he suggested that it had been stated here that, because certain nations which were permanent members of the Security Council had nuclear weapons, the fact that they were permanent members of the Security Council should be an argument for their retaining nuclear weapons. I must say that I cannot recall an argument in those terms ever having been put forward. However, in my statement at our meeting on 3 August I did say something which linked the fact of membership in the Security Council with that of being a nuclear Power. With your permission, I shall read what I said on that occasion:

"One way to state the right to security against attack by nuclear weapons for those countries which are willing to forgo the right to make these themselves might be by way of a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly; but that probably would have to be reinforced by other assurances. We would call to mind again the fact that the nuclear Powers are also the permanent members of the Security Council; and I think it is reasonable to say that in both those capacities they have a particular responsibility for seeing that the peace is kept and that the less powerful countries within the United Nations can live without the fear of being 'atomized', so to speak." (ENDC/PV.319, para. 30)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

16. You will note that what I spoke of was the "responsibility" of the members of the Security Council, which happen to be also the countries with nuclear weapons. I referred not to privileges but to responsibilities. I certainly did not offer the argument that any country, no matter how great and powerful at present, should be permitted to retain nuclear weapons for ever; in fact I have offered arguments to the contrary. I repeat what I emphasized at that time, in regard to the dual capacity of the great Powers: that it is their responsibility for keeping peace, not any privilege to maintain certain nuclear armaments.

17. The Canadian delegation agrees with the representative of India that, when we come to discuss the draft treaty which is being prepared, the question of security will be very important, particularly to all countries that have problems of security. In our view this is not a problem that can be solved by writing terms -- other than very general terms -- into the treaty; but we know there are countries which have problems -- great problems -- of security with their neighbours. Finland is, of course, not fearful of what the Soviet Union might do, neither is the Soviet Union fearful of what Finland might do. The other examples which were quoted could be put in the same category.

18. However, it is known to all members of this Committee that there are places in the world where there is great tension, where war has broken out before, and which, if nuclear weapons were introduced, might form ignition spots for the general use of nuclear weapons. Acting on the old British Army principle of "No names, no pack drill", I will not name any such country. That is all I have to say for the present.

19. Mr. TRIVEDI (India): I am glad that the representative of Canada has emphasized the point that no one in this Committee has used the argument in favour of legitimizing the possession of nuclear weapons by the permanent members of the Security Council. In fact I thought I said so in my statement, but I am glad he emphasized that and I should like to re-emphasize it. I do not think any member of this Committee has so argued, but it has been said in the General Assembly. Following the wise example of the representative of Canada, I will not mention the names of the countries that made such statements in the General Assembly.



(Mr. Trivedi, India)

20. On the question of security, I am glad the representative of Canada realized the importance of security. As I said, the matter is always viewed differently by countries that are members of military alliances, that have weapons stationed on their territories and that feel they have no security problems. However, we are talking of a question of principle, not a question of individual examples. When I referred to the United States and Cuba, for example, I was not saying that they were not on friendly terms; they are on the best of friendly terms. It is not so much a matter of quoting examples; we have to look into the question of general principles. We are not legislating for individual cases and for differences, real or imaginary, which might exist between nations.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 321st plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Hussein Khallaf, representative of the United Arab Republic.

"Statements were made by the representatives of India and Canada.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 15 August 1967, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.5 a.m.

